COMMENTS
THE CONCEPT OF PUNITIVE LEGISLATION AND THE
SIXTH AMENDMENT: A NEW LOOK AT.
KENNEDY v. MENDOZA-MARTINEZt
In American courts and under the stamp of governmental administrators, individuals suffer many deprivations as onerous as confinement
in prison. An alien's deportation to the long-forgotten land of his
original citizenship may be as objectionable to him as a period behind
bars.' Equally to be feared is the involuntary loss of citizenship, which
renders one susceptible to deportation and exclusion from the United
States. Even the ubiquitous money judgment, when disproportionate
to the defendant's ability to pay, can have more lasting consequences
than a short spell in the penitentiary.
Yet in one significant respect, imprisonment stands apart from these
other sanctions. Along with torture and capital punishment, imprisonment is historically the dominant social response to behavior defined
and spoken of as criminal. Indeed, the common law and its codifications
have customarily labelled "criminal" only those acts penalized by imprisonment, torture or death.
As well as standing at the core of the historically developed notion
of criminal punishment, the sentence of imprisonment is, to the same
degree, correlated with the procedural requirements surrounding the
criminal process. Under the sixth amendment, as under the common
law, the accused in a criminal proceeding receives more protection in
the fact-finding process than his counterpart in the civil proceeding.
Trial by jury, confrontation of witnesses, and representation by counsel
-all are among the historic safeguards guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the accused in a federal criminal prosecution. To invoke the
t George Fletcher, Fellow in the Foreign Law Program at the University of Chicago
Law School, currently studying at University of Freiburg, Germany. J.D., University
of Chicago, 1964. For a discussion of related problems arising from the Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez decision, see Comment, The Availability of Criminal Jury Trials
Under the Sixth Amendment, 32 U. Cnm. L. Rxv. 311 (1965), infra.
I From Mr. Justice Brandeis' pen has come a phrase cited frequently to show that
the Supreme Court acknowledges deportation as a serious sanction: "It may result...
in loss of both property and life; or of all that makes life worth living." Ng Fung Ho v.
White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922).
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protections of the sixth amendment, a defendant need demonstrate only
that he is subjected to a "criminal prosecution." 2
It seems an easy task to determine whether a prosecution is criminal
-at least, whether it is criminal in the view of the government. With
federal criminal offenses created by Congress alone,3 one need only ask
how Congress has labelled this offense. Yet permitting Congress to choose
whether the accused enjoys the rights to a jury trial and to representation by counsel conflicts with the assumption that the first ten amendments were enacted to limit the powers of the federal government.
In recognition of the restrictive purpose of the sixth amendment and
the error of looking to congressional labels, the courts have turned to
the form of sanction as the primary gauge of the criminal prosecution.
Thus in Wong Wing v. United States,4 the Supreme Court unanimously found it inconsistent with the fifth and sixth amendments for
an immigration officer to commit deportable aliens to a year's confinement at hard labor. Addressing itself solely to the quality of the sanction,
the Court concluded that despite congressional labels to the contrary,
a sentence of imprisonment rendered the proceeding equivalent to a
"criminal prosecution." Although the aliens were subject to administrative determination of their deportability, they could validly object
to the administrative imposition of a year's confinement prior to deportation. To defend against. being jailed, the aliens could demand
the protections of a criminal trial.
Even if necessary to preserve the sixth amendment as a limitation
on congressional power, the Wong Wing approach has its own methodological difficulty. Certainly the sanction is an important historical char2 Article III, § 2, cl. 3 of the Constitution contains a supplementary provision,
"The trial of all crimes .. .shall be by jury .... " which has been subsumed under
the development of the sixth amendment. See CoRwiN, THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE
UNIrrED STATES OF AMERICA 638 (1952). In the fifth amendment, two references to
criminal proceedings appear, one narrower and one broader than the term "criminal
prosecution" used in the sixth amendment. The narrower concept, that of the "infamous crime," is limited to offenses punishable at least by imprisonment in a state
or federal penitentiary; this concept is used as the standard for the requirement of
the grand jury indictment. See Mackin v. United States, 117 U.S. 348 (1885). The
broader concept, that of the "criminal case" which sets the scope of the privilege
against self-incrimination, extends to cases not covered by the sixth amendment. See,
e.g., Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893) (privilege applicable in a case of a
monetary fine, which would not sustain the sixth amendment). Compare Hepner v.
United States, 213 U.S. 103 (1909). See also United States v. Matles, 247 F.2d 378
(2d Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 256 (1958) (conviction of contempt
reversed; the defendant is permitted not to take the stand in a denaturalization proceeding, even though denaturalization is not a "criminal prosecution" under the
sixth amendment).
3 See CO rWN, op. cit. supra note 2, at 877.

4 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
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acteristic of a criminal proceeding, but is it more indicative of a proceeding "essentially" criminal than the style of pleading, the public or
private status of the plaintiff or the degree of the plaintiff's burden of
proof? Apparently the Court in Wong Wing regarded the nature of the
sanction as critical, but the Court's approach must be appraised in
light of the purpose of the sixth amendment.
On its face, the purpose of the amendment appears to be the procedural protection of those subjected to criminal prosecution from
hasty, mistaken applications of the substantive law. 5 The reason for
guaranteeing this extra measure of protection in criminal prosecutions
seems to be a judgment that the sanctions used against convicted criminals are, on the whole, more onerous than the sanctions imposed
against other defendants. But some non-criminal sanctions are as grave
as some criminal sanctions, and if the purpose of the safeguards is to
protect persons from mistaken imposition of grave sanctions, consistency
ought to require that protection be afforded whenever a person is
threatened with a grave sanction. Yet, while there can be little question
that -the purpose of the amendment is protective, there is room for
disagreement about the extent to which protection is to be afforded:
the purpose of the safeguards gives content to, but is also limited by,
the phrase "criminal prosecution."
Fidelity to the history of the phrase would lead one to restrict the
sixth amendment at least 6 to proceedings in which the state threatens
imprisonment, torture or death. With the amendment's purpose suggesting a broader sweep, however, the boundaries to the amendment
are ever in tension. Historical factors have shaped several results which
are squarely inconsistent with a policy of protecting all those faced
with sanctions felt to be as grave as those customarily used against
convicted criminals. Relying on tradition, the Supreme Court has recently affirmed the denial of a jury trial in a judicial contempt hearing. 7
5 This proposition, which is maintained throughout the comment, is concededly a
simplification. The interest protected by the jury trial guarantee is more subtle than
avoidance of error in application of the substantive law. No recognition is made in

this analysis of the jury's role as the ultimate legislative voice of the community.
6 The provision of a jury trial has been restricted even further in certain situations.
Although faced with penalties including death and imprisonment, the defendant in a
court-martial proceeding may not be afforded a jury. See, e.g., Kahn v. Anderson, 255
U.S. 1 (1920); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857). This too may be attributable
to tradition, since military disciplinary proceedings have not been regarded as criminal

proceedings in the usual sense. There may be something more than blind adherence

to the past at work here, however. Swift justice may be a greater value in the military
than sure justice; if so, speed may be a countervailing policy outweighing the protec-

tive purpose of the sixth amendment.
7 United States v. Barnett, 376 U.S. 681. (1964). A footnote to the opinion suggests
that the result of the case might have been different if the question had been framed
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Also, the Court has sustained the exemption of imprisonment for "petty
offenses"" from the amendment's scope; again the dominant perspective
was historical practice.
In one respect, however, the policy of the amendment has clearly
had the upper hand. To fashion a test for the type of sanction covered
by the amendment, the Supreme Court has relied on the term "punishment"--a concept that captures more the function and less the form
of the traditional criminal sanction.9 Stressing the punitive function of imprisonment, this test provides an avenue for other sanctions,
functioning in the same way, to come within the shelter of the amendment. Through identification with the concept of punishment, the
amendment has become capable of facile expansion in the direction of
protecting all those threatened with deprivations felt to be as serious
as a term in jail.
Yet, despite the emergence of the term "punishment" as the test for
its application, the sixth amendment's central concept, the "criminal
prosecution," has adhered tenaciously to its historical origins. That the
amendment extends to deportation proceedings has been frequently
argued and as frequently rejected, each time with a disregard for reason
that is characteristic of arguments drawing on the force of history. 10
Also, it has repeatedly been advanced in the Supreme Court that statutorily imposed fines could not be collected without the procedural guarantees of the sixth amendment. Not once has the Court agreed." Though
the Court has concluded that particular fines were punitive in the context of other constitutional issues, it has never held that a fine, even
differently. "However, our cases have indicated that, irrespective of the severity of the
offense, the severity of the penalty imposed, a matter not raised in this certification,

might entitle a defendant to the benefit of a jury trial.... In view of the impending
contempt hearing, effective administration of justice requires that this dictum be
added: Some members of the Court are of the view that, without regard to the
seriousness of the offense, punishment by summary trial without a jury would be
constitutionally limited to that penalty provided for petty offenses." 876 U.S. at 688
n.12. (Emphasis added.)
8 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888). For an approving survey of the historical
materials, see Frankfurter and Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 37 H v.L. REv. 917 (1926).

9 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1898); Helvering v. Mitchell,
303 U.S. 391 (1938).
10 The landmark decision, Fong Yue Ting v. United States, supra note 9, has foredosed debate whether deportation is a "criminal prosecution." The Fong Yue Ting
decision also influenced the holdings in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952) and Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) that deportation is not punitive in the
sense necessary for application of the ex post facto clause.
11 E.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909); Lloyd
Sabaudo Societa v. United States, 287 U.S. 329 (1932).

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 32.290

though designed as a deterrent and collected by the government, was
punishment in terms of the sixth amendment. 12 Indeed with one recent
dramatic exception, the Supreme Court has never endorsed expansion
of the sixth amendment beyond the historically defined criminal sanctions of imprisonment, torture and death.
That sole exception came in the 1962 decision of Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez.13 The appellee, a native-born citizen, had challenged the constitutionality of his involuntary expatriation under section 401(j) of
the Nationality Act of 1940,14 which provided for the involuntary expatriation of all those who left the country to evade the draft in time
of war. In affirming the district court's conclusion that the statute was
unconstitutional, the Court held, five votes to four, that expatriation
under section 401G) was punitive in the sense required for the application of the sixth amendment. Without the proper procedural safeguards,
the statutory scheme for expatriation failed to meet constitutional
standards.
One could look at the Court's unorthodox decision in MendozaMartinez as the sign of a new stance toward the sixth amendment, as
a portent of further extension beyond the historically defined scope of
the "criminal prosecution."' 5 But if this view is correct, it should find
12 The Court's findings of punitive sanctions fall into two broad categories:
(1) statutory interpretation, as in Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605 (1903) (interpretation of a statute denying jurisdiction to circuit courts over collection of "penalties
and forfeitures'); La Franca v. United States, 282 U.S. 568 (1931) (interpretation of
concept of prior "prosecution" under § 5 of the Willis Campbell Act, 42 Stat. 223
(1921), which barred assessment under the Volstead Act, 41 Stat. 305 (1919), after a prosecution for the same acts); Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U.S. 557 (1922) (interpretation of Volstead Act to require a hearing for assessments upon violation of the act). In these
latter two cases, the Court did mention the constitutional problems that would arise
upon a contrary reading of the statutes in question; in La Franca, under the double
jeopardy clause; in Lipke, under the due process clause of the fifth amendment.
Neither case contains an earnest consideration of the proposition that the fine was
tantamount to a "criminal prosecution" under the sixth amendment. (2) the constitutional scope of Congress' taxing power, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, as discussed in
Constantine v. United States, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S.
20(1922).
13 372 U.S. 144 (1963). The Court's opinions regretfully do not acknowledge the
path-breaking significance of the case. The majority opinion written by Mr. Justice
Goldberg treats the rationale under the sixth amendment as an outgrowth of
Supreme Court litigation on the concept of punishment. Yet in none of the cases
cited by the majority does the Court seriously consider the application of the sixth
amendment. 372 U.S. at 168-69.
14 Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137 (1940), as amended, 58 Stat. 746 (1940),
superseded by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 267-68, 8
U.S.C. § 1481(a)(10) (1958).
15 See, The Availability of Criminal Jury Trials Under the Sixth Amendment,
32 U. CM. L. RiEv. 311 (1965).
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support in the reasoning of the opinions as well as in the formal constitutional conclusion.
Doubts as to the Court's disposition to expand the sixth amendment
arise upon reading the critical arguments on the issue of punishment.
Mr. Justice Goldberg, writing for a five-man majority, 16 felt section
401(j) was rendered punitive by Congress' intent to punish wartime
draft evaders who leave the country. 17 The argument assumes, almost
as though the point were too elementary for discussion, that if Congress
enacts a statute with a punitive intent the sanction thus imposed is
punishment. But the transition from Congress' intent to the constitutional quality of the sanction is not that obvious. The argument needs
examination, especially in its relation to the assumption that the purpose of the sixth amendment is to protect defendants against the mistaken application of especially grave sanctions.
In its form, Mr. Justice Goldberg's rationale has the appealing ring
of the classic syllogism on statutory interpretation. To say that if Congress intended to punish, the sanction thus inflicted is punishment, is
very much like saying that if Congress intended to create an article III
court, the court thus created is an article III court. But the argument's
form is astoundingly deceptive. Mr. Justice Goldberg does not purport
to make an argument on the meaning of section 401(0); there was no
dispute about what the statute said. The question was not whether
Congress intended that expatriation under section 401(0) be regarded
as tantamount to a criminal prosecution. If that were Congress' intent,
which it indisputably was not, the case could have been resolved without recourse to the constitutional issues. If Congress had wished that
draft evaders suffer expatriation under section 401(j) only after conviction by criminal process, the decision in Mendoza-Martinez would
have been dear: in not having been tried and convicted, Mendoza
would not have lost his citizenship. But the statutory plan clearly envisaged expatriation without the procedures specified in the sixth
amendment. Invoking the concept of "congressional intent," Mr. Justice
Goldberg addressed himself to a problem wholly different from the
question of Congress' meaning in using the language of the statute.
But if the concept of "intent to punish" is not related to the question
of statutory meaning, it is not immediately clear what type of "intent"
forms the cornerstone of Mr. Justice Goldberg's thesis. To begin an
interpretation of the concept, one must look to the arguments used by
Mr. Justice Goldberg to prove that Congress had this curious form of
16 Though writing a separate opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan formally joined the
opinion of Justices Goldberg, Black, and Douglas and the Chief Justice. 372 U.S. at 187.
17 372 U.S. at 167.
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Strictly speaking, however, the majority does not introduce the
linguistic habit of legislators to show that section 401(j) was a punitive
sanction. Though it appears to use the cases under the old statutes
directly on the issue of punishment, the opinion relates its survey
of congressional history to the preliminary issue of Congress' "intent
to punish" in enacting section 401(j). Therefore, one can surmise that
so far as this first argument goes, the congressional "intent to punish"
consists of the legislators' practice of referring to their activity as
one which imposes punishment. But why one should be concerned about
the lay linguistic habits of congressmen is far from clear. As we have
shown, the issue is not one of determining what Congress meant in using
the language that it did, but rather whether the defendant is threatened
with punishment. The majority opinion fails to offer guidelines or even
a motivating reason for its use of legislative history in a way other than
for clarification of the statutory language.
The majority's devotion to the evolution of the statutory sanctions
against draft evaders is best taken as a prelude to its analysis of expatriation under section 401(j) of the amended 1940 Nationality Act. In approaching the current statute, however, the majority focuses more on the
issues of punishment than on the factor of Congress' intent to punish.
At this stage of the opinion, Mr. Justice Goldberg permits subtle merging
of the premise and of the conclusion, of the intent to punish and the concept of punishment.
In its second foray to prove that the sanction is punitive, the majority
turns away from the label used in the legislative background, and toward
the practical aim of Congress in levying the sanction. Examining the
circumstances that prompted enactment of the sanction in 1944, Mr.
Justice Goldberg finds an absence of congressional concern for the societal
good to follow from denationalizing draft evaders hiding abroad.22 In
the view of the majority, section 4010) was enacted for no affirmative
social purpose, but only for retribution and deterrence of draft evasion.
From this conclusion the majority infers both the "intent to punish" and
the fact of punishment. Under the majority's concept of social purpose,
the sanction itself must promote the common good; it is not enough that
the sanction achieve a desirable goal through deterrence of the conduct
against which it is used.
Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the four votes in dissent, assents
entirely to the structure of argument outlined by Mr. Justice Goldberg's
opinion. Agreeing that the issue is whether the sanction is punitive,
agreeing also that the gauge of punishment is whether the sanction furthers a societal goal, the dissent departs from the majority only at the
22

See 372 U.S. at 180-84.

1965]

KENNEDY v. MENDOZA-MARTINEZ

intent. To prove his claim, Mr. Justice Goldberg deploys two wholly
unrelated types of evidence. First, he engages in an elaborate survey of
prior legislation affecting the citizenship rights of draft evaders. Beginning with the Act of 1865, which pertained only to the "rights of citizenship," the opinion traces the evolution of the statutory sanction through
its amendment, repeal and reenactment in 1944 as an additional form
of involuntary expatriation. In this discussion of the predecessor statutes, attention is directed exclusively to the linguistic habits of Senators
and Congressmen in describing the sanction of depriving draft evaders
of their citizenship rights. The historical survey is replete with instances
in which the legislators, for one reason or another, referred to the sanction as punitive. A number of voices are heard on the question whether
the Act of 1865, because it applied to those then evading the draft,
violated the limitation of the ex post facto clause on congressional
legislation. For assuming that the sanction was punitive in the context
of ex post facto analysis, all these spokesmen are credited with saying
that the sanction was punitive in a sense relevant for application
of the sixth amendment.' 8 Others are heard who, in denouncing the
sanction, refer to it rhetorically as punishment. 19 Still others label
the sanction punitive in making the claim that the statute, as one
imposing a penalty, ought to be strictly construed.20 Amidst this
congressional potpourri of common terms and cross purposes, not
one voice emerges for the view that the sanction is punitive in a sense
relevant for application of the sixth amendment. Also, among the
cases construing the prior statutes, many refer to the action against
draft evaders as a punitive sanction. But not one case reveals earnest
consideration of the proposition so clear to the Mendoza majority:
that all punitive sanctions, no matter the sense in which they are
punitive, are equivalent to criminal prosecutions under the sixth
2
amendment. 1
18 E.g., Senator Johnson of Maryland, speaking for the Act of March 3, 1865, 13
Stat. 487; CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 642 (1865), cited in 372 U.S. at 171.
19 E.g., Rep. Roberts of Massachusetts, on the amendment of August 22, 1912, 37
Stat. 356, H.R. REP. No. 335, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 2 (1912), cited in 372 U.S. at 177.
20 CODIFICATION OF THE NATIONALrrY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES,

76th Cong., 1st

Sess. 68 (Comm. Print 1939), cited in 372 U.S. at 179.
21 In Huber v. Reilly, 53 Pa. 112 (1866), a case that figures prominently in
Mr. Justice Goldberg's exposition, the Pennsylvania court held that under the
Act of 1865, loss of citizenship rights could be imposed only after court-martial
conviction. Bolstering its reading of the statute by reference to constitutional problems
arising from a contrary reading, the court mentions the sixth amendment in passing.
One can hardly say, as would the majority in Mendoza, that the Huber court
seriously considered the conclusion reached in Mendoza: that the deprivation of citizenship (citizenship rights in Huber) renders a proceeding tantamount to a "criminal
prosecution."
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last stage of analysis: on the question whether the sanction was in fact
designed to promote a societal goal. The dissenting opinion builds on
the finding that expatriation under section 401(j) was rationally designed
to combat the deterioration of troop morale caused by unsanctioned
evasions of the draft. By not allowing draft evaders living abroad to profit
from their disloyalty, Congress "could reasonably have concluded," says
the dissent, that the sanction of expatriation was necessary to preserve
the commitment of the boys reluctantly doing their duty to country.
Thus the issue is joined. .The majority and the dissent diverge on a
single point: Did the enactment of section 401(j) have a purpose other
than retribution and deterrence? In taking opposing positions on this
central question, the majority and dissent disagree not so much on the
content as on the relevance of legislative history. The dissent stresses the
range of reasonable purposes that might have concerned Congress in
enacting the statute; the majority favors the actual record, what in fact
did concern Congress. The majority rejects the dissent's argument in one
sentence: "There was no reference [in Attorney General Biddle's letter
recommending the legislation]... to any improvement in soldier morale
or in the conduct of the war generally that would be gained by passage
23
of the statute."
In his separate opinion, Mr. Justice Brennan challenges the relevance
of the dissent's argument that the purpose of expatriation under section
401(j) was to preserve troop morale. Even if Congress had such a purpose,
the sanction would be punitive:
To my mind that would be "punishment" in the purest sense;
it would be naked vengeance. Such an exaction of retribution
would not lose that quality because it was undertaken to maintain morale. 24
Thus Mr. Justice Brennan reflects a greater willingness to evaluate con25
gressional motives in analyzing this issue of punishment.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 189.
25 Mr. Justice Brennan's view on the concept of punishment is complicated by his
nonadherence to the standard of punishment endorsed by the other eight members
of the Court. Writing the dissenting opinion in Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960),
in which the Court upheld the congressional denial of Social Security benefits to a
subclass of all deportable aliens, Mr. Justice Brennan deemed the denial punitive for
purposes of the bill of attainder clause solely because a subclass had been designated
for especially harsh treatment. The same theory reappears in Mr. Justice Brennan's
concurrence in Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 196, to meet the dissent's point that
expatriation could be conditioned on especially disloyal behavior. Brennan perceives
an analogy between selecting a subclass from all deported aliens and choosing a
subclass from all disloyal persons, the selection in each case rendering the sanction
punitive. Compare the unrelated approach to the concept of punishment in Brennan's
23

24
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In examining the logical structure of the three opinions, our end concern is with the significance of the Mendoza-Martinez decision as a harbinger of further expansion of the sixth amendment. In the direction of
that inquiry, we have isolated the central disagreement between the
majority and the dissenting opinions. As discussed above, the central
determination of the majority opinion is that section 401(0) was enacted
with no purpose other than deterrence and disapproval of draft evasion.
From this judgment of no social purpose, the majority reasons that the
purpose was punitive, that the sanction was punishment and that, accordingly, the imposition of the sanction required the procedural protection
of the sixth amendment. In reaching the core of the majority's argument
and the point of its divergence with the dissent, it is proper to ask a
question that is embarrassingly elementary: Does the presence or absence
of a social purpose relate to the interest protected by the sixth amendment? The impact of the sanction is the same whether Congress is spiteful
or is genuinely motivated by the common good. The question is whether
the defendant's interest in accurate determinations of fact derives from
the traditional gravity of criminal sanctions or from the motives of the
state in deploying these sanctions. To be fair to the defendant it makes
sense to demand that as the stakes get higher, the state should accord the
defendant greater protection against mistakes. On the other hand, it is
hard to see how the defendant's claim to protection could relate to the
motivation of the legislature in enacting the statute. To one faced with
the threat of a grave sanction, it is wholly immaterial what social good
may follow the use of the sanction. If the amendment is designed to
protect individuals, then the relevant criteria in construing the amendment should be the concerns of individuals threatened with criminal
sanctions. The state's good motivation is not one of these concerns, but
the gravity of the sanction surely is.
In their devotion to the issue of legislative motivation, the Supreme
Court's concerns are askew with the values of the sixth amendment. Only
the magic of the term "punishment" enables the Court to pass from its
examination of legislative motives to the conclusion on the sixth amendment. And rather than take the Court to task for the novel stance toward
why criminal defendants merit procedural protection, the dissent accommodatingly joins issues on whether Congress' motivation should be regarded as purposeful or not; no one suggests that this approach to the
concurrence in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 104-114 (1958), in which the Justice readily
concludes that the sanction is punitive and then inquires whether, as a punitive
sanction, it rationally implements the nonretributive purposes of the criminal law.
The complete exposition of Mr. Justice Brennan's influential role in the debate on
expatriation is yet to be made.
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sixth amendment might be wholly inapposite. Satisfied to disagree only
as far as they do, both sides accept the same standard on the issue of
punishment. Both sides are willing to limit discussion to whether the
sanction has a useful, practical social purpose.
The bedeviling question about Mendoza-Martinez is why the Court
was drawn to a seemingly inappropriate standard on the issue of punishment. The answer may be revealed by an examination of the other constitutional issue in the case that required an evaluation of legislative purpose
-the issue of Congress' authority to use expatriation as a sanction. Fully
briefed and argued before the Court, the issue of congressional authority
to enact section 4010) appeared to be the dominant issue in MendozaMartinez. Its prominence stems from two 1956 expatriation decisions in
which the Court, splintered into four doctrinal positions, concentrated
exclusively on that issue. These 1956 decisions indicate that MendozaMartinez should be read from the perspective of the Court's doubts about
congressional authority.
In Perez v. Brownel 2 6 and Trop v. Dulles,27 the Supreme Court heard
challenges to the constitutionality of provisions of the Nationality Act
of 1940, which conditioned expatriation respectively on the act of voting
in a foreign election and on a court-martial conviction for wartime desertion. Writing in Perez for the only coalescence of five votes in the two
cases, Mr. Justice Frankfurter reasoned that expatriation of citizens voting in foreign elections was a necessary and proper exercise of Congress'
power (inherent though it may be) to regulate foreign affairs. The essential point in justifying Congress' use of expatriation as a tool of policy
was the relation between the problem felt to be generated by citizens
voting abroad and the consequences of expatriation. The problem the
Court perceived in citizens' voting abroad was the embroilment of the
United States in the internal politics of foreign countries. Expatriation,
by ending the connection between the voter and the United States, would
thus remedy the problem by preventing involvement of the United
States. This is an unequivocal example of the type of sanction regarded
as non-punitive by the plurality as well as the dissent in Mendoza-Martinez. It is the paradigm for the legislative use of expatriation in the
interests of a social purpose.
By causing the five-man Perez majority to splinter, the problem raised
in Trop v. Dulles induced a refinement and a revision of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter's theory that Congress could utilize expatriation as a necessary and proper measure to implement its existing powers. Trop produced five votes in favor of the unconstitutionality of a statute condition26 356 U.S. 44 (1958).
27 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
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ing expatriation on a court-martial conviction for wartime desertion.
Among these was Mr. Justice Brennan, who broke from the five-man
Perez majority, yet used the Perez theory to support his conclusion that
expatriation for wartime desertion was outside the scope of congressional
authority. Because, Mr. Justice Brennan argued, the sanction itself did
not induce a result within the province of legitimate congressional concern, the sanction was beyond the reach of Congress. The other four votes
from the Perez majority rallied to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent, which
introduced a more flexible version of the theory that the sanction itself
had to promote a consequence identifiable with the constitutionally prescribed aims of Congress. To uphold the expatriation of deserters as a
proper exercise of Congress' power to provide for the common defense,
Mr. Justice Frankfurter made a variety of points. The Justice noted that
"Congress may deal severely with the problem of desertion from the
armed forces in wartime,"28 and that there is a rational nexus between
refusal to perform this ultimate duty of American citizenship and legislative withdrawal of that citizenship.2 9 He even made the point that was
to become so prominent in the Mendoza dissent, that Congress could
reasonably have enacted the sanction in the interest of maintaining troop
morale 3 0 Amidst these diffuse arguments, Mr. Justice Frankfurter never
reiterates the central point of the Perez majority: that the use of expatriation as a sanction is constitutional only if it yields a result directly-not
through deterrence-that is within the sphere of purposes permitted to
Congress. So far as it takes a dear position, the dissent in Trop embraces
the view, later adopted by the dissent in Mendoza-Martinez, that the
necessary connection between expatriation and the delegated powers
could derive from the deterrent effect of threatening expatriation. Thus,
in the dissent's flexible perspective, the purpose to suppress wartime
desertion would be sufficient to enable Congress to use expatriation in
implementing its power to provide for the common defense.
Of the four Justices dissenting in Perez, the three now on the CourtJustices Black and Douglas and the Chief Justice-have never accepted
the theory that expatriation legislation is sustainable under the necessary
and proper clause of article I. In Perez these three maintained the courageous proposition that Congress had absolutely no power to deprive an
individual of his citizenship; the most Congress could do would be to
prescribe conditions "that may rationally be said to constitute an
abandonment of citizenship." Accepting the precedent value of the
majority position in Perez, the Chief Justice shifted doctrinal bases in
28

376 U.S. at 121.
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Id. at 122.

30 Ibid.
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formulating a rationale for the plurality-the same three plus Mr. Justice
Whittaker-that joined Mr. Justice Brennan in declaring unconstitutional the expatriation of wartime military deserters. It would no longer
do to argue that Congress had absolutely no power to impose involuntary
expatriation, for that would conflict with the holding in Perez. To accept
Perez as a precedent and yet not to subscribe to the theory of its majority,
the plurality led by the Chief Justice devised a distinct rationale for
invalidating the use of expatriation against wartime deserters. Rather
than argue that Congress had no power over expatriation (which was
rejected in Perez) or that this particular use of expatriation fell beyond
the scope of the necessary and proper clause (which would be to accept
the standard of Perez), the plurality invoked one of the specific limitations on the power granted to Congress under article I: expatriation of
wartime deserters violates the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the eighth amendment. Part of the doctrinal construction in invoking
the eighth amendment was the conclusion that the sanction constituted
punishment. To the theory of punishment devised by the Trop plurality,
we shall eventually return.
To summarize, the two 1956 decisions yielded four fully developed
theories of congressional powers over expatriation. There were two forms
of reliance on the necessary and proper clause-that of Mr. Justice
Brennan and that of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his Trop dissent. There
were the two doctrinal assertions of Justices Black and Douglas and the
.Chief Justice: the denial of all power over involuntary expatriation and
the use of the eighth amendment to deny that power in a particular case.
With this backdrop of unresolved debate, which was made even more
uncertain by the arrival of Justices White and Goldberg to the
Court, it was expected that the issue of congressional authority would
dominate the Court's attention in Mendoza-Martinez. It was the constitutional issue on which the briefs fastened their rhetorical power. It
was the issue on which the district court below had found section 4 01(j)
unconstitutional. Yet it may have been an issue too difficult for disposition by the Supreme Court. Against the backdrop of the fractured 1956
decisions and the arrival of two Justices to the Court, the majority turned
away from the issue of congressional authority, an issue perhaps too
controversial for five, or even four, Justices to unite. Instead the Court
addressed itself to a problem not argued before it, the problem of procedural adequacy under the sixth amendment.
Written against the background of the Perez and Trop decisions as
well as against the arguments immediately before the Court, the opinions
in Mendoza-Martinez tend to reflect more sensitivity to the problem of
congressional authority than to the values of the sixth amendment. Sev-
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eral strong dues prompt this unorthodox suggestion. Foremost among
these dues is the structure of Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion for the four
votes in dissent. Favoring the constitutionality of section 401(j), the dissent needed to vindicate Congress' authority to expatriate wartime draft
evaders hiding abroad as well as to sustain the imposition of the sanction
without the procedural guarantees of the sixth amendment. In these two
seemingly disparate channels of constitutional justification, the dissent
relies on arguments that are nearly identical. Having argued that the
sanction was not punitive because Congress could reasonably have believed that expatriating draft evaders would bolster troop morale, Mr.
Justice Stewart deploys the same point to argue that the enactment of
section 401() was a necessary and proper exercise of Congress' war powers
and, accordingly, within the authority delegated to Congress under artide 1.31 By using the same argument under ostensibly different issues, the
dissent suggests that the values underlying the two doctrinal disputes are
the same.
Further comparison of the Trop and Mendoza opinions suggests that
the majority as well as the dissent in Mendoza tends to regard the issue
of punishment as synonymous with the issue of congressional authority.
Though with different doctrinal implications, the Mendoza opinions ask
the same question as did Mr. Justice Brennan in Trop: does the use of
expatriation as a sanction have a purpose other than retribution and
deterrence? For Mr. Justice Brennan, an additional condition is present.
Not any purpose other than retribution and deterrence would do;
the purpose must conform to the legislative objectives prescribed by
article I as well. Yet for both doctrinal conclusions-that the sanction is
punitive and that it violates the restraints of article I-an indispensable
condition was the finding that the sole purposes of the sanction were
retribution and deterrence. Thus when the majority behind Mr. Justice
Goldberg argues that section 401(j) is a punitive sanction, it is arguing
to a conclusion that encompasses that of Mr. Justice Brennan in his Trop
concurrence. In one instance, however, the judgment on legislative
mbtivation leads to a conclusion on the punitiveness of the sanction; in
the other, to a conclusion on Congress' authority to enact the sanction.
31 One additional point, however, is made on behalf of the argument of congressional authority, namely that the congressional purpose "to end a potential drain on
the country's military manpower" would be sufficient to support expatriation under
the war powers. 376 U.S. at 213. Arguing that Congress could use expatriation as a
deterrent to bring about the constitutionally permissible end of suppressing draft
evasion, Mr. Justice Stewart carried forward the theory of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in the Trop decision. Like the Trop dissent, the Mendoza dissent subscribes
to the theory that Congress may use expatriation as it would any other sanction, the
only limitation being its authority to deter the conduct made an expatriating
condition.
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That the same judgment is critical under diverse doctrines reflects a
common concern. In the sense that it follows the pattern of Mr. Justice
Brennan's argument in Trop, the majority's argument in Mendoza reflects a continuation of the debate that compelled the Court's attention
in the Trop decision, the debate on the issue of congressional authority.
Confirmation for the thesis that the Mendoza court regarded the issue
of congressional authority as virtually interchangeable with the issue of
punishment is found in the treatment given by the majority and dissenting opinions to Mr. Justice Frankfurter's thesis in Perez v. Brownell. That
thesis was direct and unequivocal: Congress has the authority under the
foreign affairs power and the necessary and proper clause to effect the
expatriation of those who vote in a foreign election. The opinion in Perez
made no mention of punishment. Neither the government nor the appellant had addressed itself to that issue. Yet in reviewing the significance
of the Perez decision, Mr. Justice Goldberg says:
In Perez the contention that Section 401(e) [expatriation by
voting in a foreign election] was penal in character was impliedly
rejected by the Court's holding . . . that voting in a political

election in a foreign state "is regulable by Congress under its
power to deal with foreign affairs." 3 2
Reflecting the same interpretation of the Perez decision, the dissent
regards the decision as relevant on the issue whether section 4010) imposes punishment. Arguing that the expatriation of wartime draft
evaders is not punitive, the dissent concludes:
Rather, the statute seems to me precisely the same kind of regulatory measure, rational and efficacious, which this Court upheld
8
against similar objections in Perez v. Brownell.3
That both the Mendoza majority and dissent view Perez as a precedent
on the issue of punishment suggests that both sides regard the debate on
punishment as a medium for analyzing the issue that confronted the
Court in Perez: the issue of congressional authority to expatriate. But if
this is accurate, one is left with the bewildering question of how it could
have happened: where is the basis in constitutional tradition for this
peculiar use of the concept of punishment?
The beginnings of an answer are found by looking to the open reliance
in the majority and dissenting Mendoza opinions on cases dealing with
the propriety of legislation under the bill of attainder and ex post facto
clauses of the Constitution. Application of these clauses requires a preliminary finding that the sanction is punitive. Under the accepted bill of
82
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attainder formula, analysis is completed by finding that the punishment
is imposed without a judicial trial; under the ex post facto clause, that
the punishment is inflicted retroactively.
An entrancing tale is found in the way these clauses evolved into a
medium for examining legislative rationality, and in the way this function carried over into other areas of constitutional debate, eventually
to appear as the focal point for the plurality and dissenting opinions in
Mendoza-Martinez. In the constitutional development of these seemingly
unrelated clauses, we can find a perspective on the Court's use of the
sixth amendment concept of punishment as a framework for examining
legislative motivation and authority.
Bill of attainder doctrine was formulated in the years between the
Civil War and the evolution of the fourteenth amendment as the Supreme
Court's vehicle for review of state legislation. Without the due process
and equal protection clauses, the Supreme Court had little constitutional
basis for an aggressive examination of state legislative authority. Yet in
the wake of the Confederacy's surrender, the Supreme Court began to
regard the content and rationality of state legislation as a fitting subject
for evaluation by the federal judiciary. In the 1866 decision of Cummings
v. Missouri 4 a sharply divided Court embarked on the task of recasting
the relation of the states to the federal judiciary. To support its holding
that an amendment to the Missouri constitution conflicted with the
federal constitution, the Court used the bill of attainder clause as a new
tool of constitutional theory. Also the ex post facto clause appeared for
the first time to have the flexibility of applying to a wide range of state
legislation. For its overwhelming influence in the Court's doctrinal
thinking a century later in Mendoza-Martinez, the decision in Cummings deserves detailed attention.
In 1865 the people of Missouri amended the state constitution to
restrict the occupational freedom of those who had supported the
cause of the Confederacy. For those who wished to teach in educational
institutions, to serve as priests or engage in other specified activities, the
amendment required an oath of non-involvement and non-sympathy with
"armed hostility to the United States." Criminal sanctions (imprisonment and a fine) faced those like Cummings, a Catholic priest,
who engaged in the proscribed activity without taking the oath. Convicted and sentenced, Cummings perfected his appeal through the state
courts and, while the post-civil war amendments were still circulating for
ratification, he took his challenge under the "old" constitution to the
United States Supreme Court.
34
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In his opinion in support of the Court's invalidation of the Missouri
test-oath, Mr. Justice Field fashioned doctrine to bridge the language of
the past and the thinking of the present. There was little to draw upon
but the bill of attainder and ex post facto dauses. 35 These clauses had
never before been used by the Supreme Court to justify the invalidation
of state or federal legislation. The scope of the ex post facto clause had,
however, been given a verbal gloss in a line of decisions rejecting its application. The concept had become identified with two elements: (1)
retrospective application and (2) a criminal sanction.3 6 But from the
first decision construing the dause, 37 the term punishment had been used
to characterize the requirement of a criminal sanction. Thus, with
fidelity to the language of past cases, Mr. Justice Field was able to
frame the issue under the ex post facto clause to be whether "the States
can in effect inflict a punishment for a past act that was not punishable
at the time it was committed."38 Under this formulation, no inquiry need
be made as to the nature of the criminal process or of the criminal
sanction. The term "punishment," originally used to describe criminal
sanction, became an independent test for applying the ex post facto
clause. With the element of retroactivity ostensibly satisfied by the oath's
attaching to civil war activity, the sole question in applying the clause in
Cummings was whether the restriction of occupational freedom was a
punitive sanction.
Although the ex post facto clause had a gloss requiring its equation
with punitive sanction, the bill of attainder clause had received no
judicial clarification prior to 1866. To define the clause, Mr. Justice
Field referred in part to acknowledged historical instances of bills of
attainder. English history abounds with bills of attainder, which generally were parliamentary judgments that specified individuals suffer
corruption of blood, death or banishment.3 9 Faithful to this history,
Mr. Justice Field noted one critical element: the absence of judicial
determination of fact. Yet he cavalierly disregarded the historical precedents in determining the added requirements for the clause's application. The Cummings definition for a bill of attainder, which was to
35 Of the limitation on state legislative authority in art. I, § 10, the only other
clause seemingly capable of flexible use is the clause prohibiting "law impairing the
obligation of contracts." See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). The facts
in Cummings, however, presented not the shred of a contract.
36 United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Cas. 84, 86 (No. 15,285) (C.C.D. Pa. 1809).
87 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
3S871 U.S. at 319.
89 In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946), Mr. Justice Frankfurter argued
that the bill of attainder clause be strictly limited to historical roots. For the difficulty
of isolating the controlling historical criteria, see the illuminating Comment, 72
YALE L.J. 330 (1962).
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influence all succeeding development of the clause, was cast with unfortunate disregard for the breadth of its terms:
A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment
40
without a judicial trial.
In relying on the term "punishment," Mr. Justice Field correctly described, but nonetheless overshot, the historical record. For while bills of
attainder inflicted punishment, this was not their only characteristic.
Since the Missouri amendment of 1865 obviously satisfied the requirement that the sanction be imposed by the legislature without a judicial
trial, the only inatter for decision under the Field definition was whether
the deprivation of occupational freedom constituted punishment.
The argument that the restriction of occupational freedom was punitive was developed by two points; one positive, the other dispelling an
imagined objection. On the positive side Mr. Justice Field argued that
the sanction was punitive because, as it appeared to the majority, the
Missouri legislature had acted retributively toward the fellow-travelers
of the Confederacy. To reach this conclusion, the majority reasoned that
participation in the rebellion had no "possible relation to [the participants'] . . . fitness for those pursuits and professions [affected by the

amendment.]" 41 The restriction on occupational freedom was not designed to regulate the designated occupations. Since the Court could
perceive no permissible legislative purpose other than that of setting
occupational qualifications, it reasoned that the Missouri test-oath had
no rational purpose-that the deprivation of occupational freedom was
imposed as an end in itself, as retribution, as punishment.
The second thrust of the argument dispelled the possible objection
that deprivations of economic freedom could not conceptually be regarded as punishment. To prove this untrue, Mr. Justice Field gave
numerous examples of similar sanctions used as sentences in formal
criminal convictions.
The argument on punishment turned on an examination of legislative motivation. And the central point of this examination was the
judgment-not by the legislature, but by the Court-that sympathy with
the Confederacy was not a factor rationally related to suitability for the
occupations restricted by the Missouri amendment. The Court's conclusion that the restriction was visited as retributive punishment came from
this judgment and the assumption that no other legislative purpose would
be permissible; on the basis of this conclusion, the amendment was
40 71 U.s. at 319. As it stands, the formula for the bill of attainder clause is
identical with that for declaring a punitive sanction unconstitutional under the
sixth amendment.
41 71 U.S. at 320.
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declared invalid under the ex post facto and bill of attainder clauses.
Distinguishing the formal basis of the decision from the controlling
arguments, one sees in the Court's judgment the beginnings of its enduring practice of judging the reasonableness of state legislation. The
practice began with the aid of ingenious judicial construction of the bill
of attainder and ex post facto clauses, to be shifted in time to the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Through the concept of
punishment, the Court was able to implement the type of value judgments on state legislation that were later to become the mainstay of due
process litigation.
In cases shortly after Cummings, Mr. Justice Field's novel use of the
ex post facto and bill of attainder clauses merged with analysis under the
due process clause. In Dent v. West Virginia,42 a unanimous Court,
again speaking through Mr. Justice Field, upheld a state statute requiring doctors either to have graduated from medical school or to have
passed a special examination. Finding the regulation a reasonable
exercise of the state's police power, the Court phrased its doctrinal conclusion both under the due process clause and under the bill of
attainder clause. On the issue of due process, it was enough to say that
the regulation was not arbitrary. On the bill of attainder clause, the
Court was satisfied to distinguish Cummings on the ground that in Dent
that state had enacted a valid qualification.
The ex post facto rationale of Cummings merged with due process
analysis in Hawker v. New York,48 just as the bill of attainder rationale
had in Dent. Though split six to three, the Court upheld the retroactive
application of a New York statute barring convicted felons from the
practice of medicine. The theory of the majority was straightforward:
the restriction was a reasonable exercise of the state's power to regulate
the practice of medicine. Under the due process clause, the Court could
use its judgment on the reasonableness of the state statute as the ultimate
basis for decision; there was no longer a need for a detour through the
concept of punishment. With the due process clause supplanting their
Cummings function, the bill of attainder and ex post facto clauses
ceased to be used by the Court as techniques for invalidating legislation
44
not felt to relate rationally to an acceptable legislative purpose.
42 129 U.S. 114 (1889).
43 170 U.S. 189 (1898).
44 The bill of attainder clauses were used as vehicles for examining legislative
rationality in two other test-oath cases: Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866)
(companion case to Cummings) and Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872).
Since the post civil war test oath cases, all invocations of the bill of attainder clause,
except for the literalist application in United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946),
have been rejected. See the complete list of cases rejecting application of the clause
in Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 330, 335 n.46 (1962).

KENNEDY v. MENDOZA-MARTINEZ

Although the Cummings approach to the bill of attainder clause has
lost its function to due process analysis, the concept of punishment
developed by Mr. Justice Field has continued to have vast appeal.
Punishment, according to Cummings, is retribution, the absence of a
rational, acceptable legislative purpose. Looking to legislative motivation
is a seemingly easier guide to whether a sanction is punitive than estimation of the quantitative seriousness of the sanction. Thus, the argument
has frequently appeared that a money sanction is not punitive because
the legislature had the purpose of providing compensation: with a purpose of compensation, the sanction is not retributive and thus not
5
punitive.4
Although the legislative intent argument has been used several times
in Supreme Court opinions to support the conclusion that a sanction was
not punitive, not until the 1956 expatriation cases was the Cummings
argument re-employed to invalidate legislation under a constitutional
concept of punishment. Writing f6r the plurality in Trop v. Dulles,
Chief Justice Warren relied exclusively on the theory of Cummings
and the subsequent bill of attainder cases to sustain the conclusion that
the sanction was punitive and thus potentially invalid as cruel and
unusual punishment. The use of the argument so established, the Court
invoked the bill of attainder tradition again in Mendoza-Martinez, this
time to reason that expatriation was punitive and thus tantamount to a
criminal prosecution.
The bill of attainder clause, as it functions in Cummings, and the
eighth amendment, as it was applied in Trop, each provide a medium for
analysis and judgment on the issue of congressional authority to enact
a particular sanction. This synonymity of purpose permits breeding the
Cummings approach to punishment with the doctrine of cruel and
unusual punishments. But the gulf between the bill of attainder clause
and the sixth amendment is not so easily bridged. The former focuses
on the scope of legislative competence, the latter on the requirements of
procedure. Each has its domain. Questions of procedural adequacy arise
only on the assumption that Congress has the authority to enact a sanction. One clause is concerned with the question whether, the other, with
the question how. Transferring criteria for punishment from one clause
to the other produces strange results. It produced the result in MendozaMartinez of a decision formally based on the sixth amendment, but
whose rationale bespeaks a concern for the issue of congressional
authority.
45 See, e.g., Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148 (1956); United States
ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943). In these cases the issue of punishment
arose under the double jeopardy clause.
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Before, the Court had only the issue of congressional authority to
trouble it in expatriation cases. Now it carries in its repertoire of five-tofour precedents on expatriation a unique decision on the sixth amendment-a decision which for the first time acknowledges the application of
the sixth amendment to a sanction other than imprisonment, torture and
death, but which nonetheless bespeaks more concern for legislative
motivation than for the protection of the individual accused. MendozaMartinez is old wine bottled anew: it expresses an old dispute in a
doctrinal innovation. As a hybrid of doctrine on one plane and concern
on another, it neither foretells new doctrine nor resolves the old concerns. Because the decision is rooted in a conflict on the scope of
congressional authority, it is hardly a reliable harbinger of expansion of
the sixth amendment. It forestalls, but does not satisfy the need for a
new synthesis and a new majority position on the authority of Congress
to use expatriation as a sanction.

